Intercultural Philosophy and Constructive Dialogue on Cross-Cultural Norms

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Abstract

This paper considers the contribution that philosophy in general, and intercultural philosophy in particular, might be able to make to the field of intercultural relations. In an increasingly globalized world, as people from different cultures come into greater contact with each other, they quickly realize that they may have completely different sets of beliefs about how people *should* think and act. Such beliefs are called *norms*. When conflicts arise due to differences in cultural norms, we need to be able to negotiate these differences in ways that allow people from different cultures to successfully interact with each other and address mutually shared problems. This paper suggests that new forms of cross-cultural interaction require the construction of entirely new *intercultural* norms to govern relationships between people from different cultures. The central question for intercultural philosophy, then, is how dialogue on such norms can be effectively conducted, given the fact that different cultures have differing forms of rationality, knowledge, values, ethics, and so forth which often seem incommensurable with each other. Intercultural dialogue can work towards the effective integration of ideas that on the surface appear incommensurable and, moreover, towards the generation of entirely new norms appropriate to newly emergent problems.

Globalization and intercultural norms

Globalization is bringing people from different cultures closer together than they have ever been before, making manifest the various ways in which people are not only similar to each other but also different. As people from different cultures come into greater contact with each other, they quickly realize that while they indeed share many similarities, they may also have completely different sets of beliefs about how people *should* think and act. Such beliefs are called *norms*. Even a limited amount of cross-cultural experience makes one aware that there is a great deal of variety in the norms held

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by people from different cultures, not only with respect to customs and communication styles, but also with respect to deeper attitudes towards reality, knowledge, values, ethics, politics, and religion. Cultural differences with respect to norms are frequently a source of conflict, especially when people from one culture adopt the ethnocentric view that their own particular norms are in some way "universal" or "superior" to those of other cultures.

Cross-cultural encounters are by their very nature *anomic,* which literally means "without law," or in a looser translation "without norms." Every culture has certain norms regarding what are considered to be "appropriate" and "inappropriate" ways of thinking and behaving, which function to govern the interactions people have with each other in the context of that culture. The norms that we learn in our respective cultures teach us how to interact successfully with people from our own cultures, but they tell us little or nothing about how to get along with people from other cultures whose norms may be quite different from ours. Nonetheless, in an increasingly globalized world we need to be able to live and work together with people from different cultures, despite the fact that their norms are different from our own. When conflicts arise we need to be able to negotiate these differences in ways that allow people from different cultures to successfully interact with each other and address commonly shared problems.

It can be argued that current trends towards globalization are creating entirely new forms of cross-cultural interaction which require the construction of entirely new *intercultural* norms to govern relationships between people from different cultures. The central question which must be asked, then, is how dialogue on such norms can be effectively conducted, given the fact that different cultures have differing forms of rationality, knowledge, values, ethics, and so forth which often seem incommensurable with each other. A constructivist approach to this question would suggest that since many of the norms which might be used to govern cross-cultural interactions do not yet exist, they can only be created—i.e., *constructed*—through a dialogical process in which the participants attempt to critique existing norms in both their own and other cultures, and to arrive at a more adequate set of norms which are capable of facilitating the relationships they have both with each other and with the world they jointly inhabit. Constructivism acknowledges the historically contingent and socially situated nature of

cultural discourses, but nonetheless contends that globalization has created an entirely new *situs* in which dialogue on cross-cultural norms is not only possible but also necessary.

Rather than see the different forms of rationality, knowledge, values, ethics, and the like which have been historically developed by different cultures as sources of conflict, it may be better to treat them as conceptual resources which can be used to widen our view of the multifarious ways in which it is possible for people to think about and act in the world. Constructivism approaches intercultural dialogue from a dialectical perspective, which attempts to critically evaluate and integrate insights from a variety of cultures for use in specific cross-cultural interactions. Since all epistemological, moral, and political constructions are based on interactions which take place in specific historical, geographical, and cultural settings, none captures the full range of possibilities for human thought or action. By acknowledging the contingency of all cultural constructions, intercultural dialogue can proceed through a dialectical communicative process which reflects back on existing cultural constructions, evaluates them in accordance with their adequacy for dealing with shared problems, and constructs new conceptual frameworks which draw on insights from varying cultural sources. Intercultural dialogue can work towards the effective integration of ideas that on the surface appear incommensurable and, moreover, towards the generation of entirely new concepts and norms appropriate to newly emergent problems. Such dialogue involves both a radical critique of existing social arrangements and the creative imagining of new alternatives that can enable people to effectively work together towards the resolution of mutually shared problems.

A normative approach to intercultural relations

Intercultural relations can be studied from a variety of academic disciplines in the social sciences, including psychology, linguistics, communication studies, anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, and history, as well as by philosophy. The main difference between the approaches taken by the social sciences and philosophy to intercultural relations is that the social sciences use empirical and theoretical methods to give us a better understanding of the similarities and differences in how people from

different cultures think and act, while philosophy adopts a normative approach which considers how cooperation across cultures can be fostered to resolve mutually shared problems. Developing such an approach to intercultural relations can be seen as one of the tasks that can be undertaken by the emerging field of intercultural philosophy.[1]

Normative approaches to intercultural relations can be distinguished from empirical and theoretical approaches in terms of both method and focus. Empirical approaches concern themselves primarily with describing existing patterns of beliefs, values, and behavior in particular cultures and making generalizations about how people from different cultures are likely to think and act in intercultural situations. Theoretical approaches attempt to offer explanations about why people from different cultures think and act the way they do. Rather than simply empirically observe and theoretically analyze human thought and behavior across cultures, as science does, normative approaches consider how problems that arise as a result of cultural differences in thought and behavior might be resolved. The problems may concern purely practical matters or involve deeper conflicts over beliefs, values, and norms, and may occur at a variety of levels, from the interpersonal to the inter-organizational to the international.

Consider, for example, the types of conflicts that might emerge in an intercultural marriage, a joint venture between companies from different cultures, or political negotiations between two countries. Empirically observing and theoretically analyzing the cultural differences which lead to such conflicts is undoubtedly important. Yet, neither an empirical nor a theoretical approach can tell us anything whatsoever about how these conflicts might be resolved. The two sides in an intercultural conflict may be able to see and understand the problems they are facing and what is causing them very clearly. What is needed, however, are solutions to the conflict, and such solutions cannot be found by simply observing and analyzing the cultural differences which exist between them. Rather, solutions to such conflicts can only be arrived at through a process of dialogue and negotiation, the aim of which is to reach a normative agreement about how the two sides are to interact with each other.

It should be made clear from the very start, however, that the aim of intercultural philosophy is not to tell people or cultural groups what they should believe or do, but rather to look at norms from a philosophical perspective in the same way that the social

sciences look at them from a social science perspective. While the methodologies are different, a philosophical analysis of norms is no different from a social science analysis of norms in this respect. While the aim of empirical social science is to describe the various norms that exist within different cultures, the aim of intercultural philosophy is to consider how these norms can be talked about, analyzed, and argued for or against in the context of a free and open dialogue.

A *norm* can be defined as any idea, whether implicit or explicit, about how people *should* think or act. The study of norms can be found in every branch of philosophy: what should be regarded as real or unreal (metaphysics), valid or invalid (logic), true or false (epistemology), good or bad (value theory), beautiful or ugly (aesthetics), right or wrong (ethics)? While it is possible to examine cultural differences in each of these areas from the standpoint of "pure philosophy," intercultural philosophy can be regarded as an area of applied philosophy, which addresses the practical problems that arise in everyday life when people holding different cultural norms interact with each other. As such, intercultural philosophy is something that can be engaged in not only by professional philosophers, but by anyone. Whenever people, whether individually or collectively, ask and try to answer questions about what is true or false, good or bad, right and wrong, and all the rest, they are engaging in philosophy. Philosophy can be one tool, among others, that helps us to resolve conflicts across cultures.

Normative judgments in intercultural relations

Normative positions are essential to the formulation of social, economic, and political policy, which require judgments to be made not only with respect to "what the problems are," but also with respect to "what should be done about them." Simply defining what constitutes "a problem" requires a normative judgment that a particular issue is important and deserves attention. Although the objective conditions may be the same for all observers, there are a variety of ways in which those conditions can be interpreted, meaning that what might be seen as a problem by some is not seen as a problem by others. Once a problem has been identified, however, a viable solution must be found which resolves the problem in a way that is satisfactory to everyone involved.

Given the fact that problems are often politicized, there are indeed good reasons for thinking that the role of science should be simply to provide information while decision-making power should be left to the public or its representatives. Nonetheless, while it is frequently contended that normative positions must be bracketed out of social science research in the interest of maintaining scientific objectivity, it is clear that normative positions are an inseparable, if often unacknowledged, part of every social science. Psychologists, sociologists, economists, and political scientists routinely make prescriptions about "what should be done," based on the norms they hold about what constitutes a "healthy" mind, society, economy, or political order. Researchers in the field of intercultural relations typically adopt normative stances against ethnocentrism, racism, sexism, and the like. Value judgments permeate even the most "objective" research, even if it is only to the extent of deciding that one area of research should be focused on rather than another. It is unavoidable that research will ultimately be based on implicit normative stances arising out of the particular interests of the researchers involved (and often their funders).

Nonetheless, trying to maintain scientific objectivity by looking solely at the "facts," unclouded by a researcher's personal opinions and values, is a commendable methodological stance, and it also prevents scientific research from being dominated by political ideologies and imperatives. While the pursuit of a "value-free" science[2] can still be set forth as an ideal to be aspired to, researchers need to be aware of and to openly state their own value orientations more explicitly. The idea of *reflexivity* in the social sciences[3] is that researchers do not occupy a privileged position from which all other positions can be judged. Rather, researchers must acknowledge the biases, interests, and positions they bring with them to the research process, and be willing to submit these to the same critical reflection that is used when considering and evaluating the positions of others.

While it may be impossible to attain complete objectivity, there are still good reasons why researchers in disciplines related to intercultural relations should try, to the extent possible, to avoid making value judgments about the norms and practices of the cultures they study. A major concern for any discipline that studies cultural differences is avoiding ethnocentrism, the tendency to judge the norms of another culture on the basis

of one's own cultural norms. To avoid making ethnocentric judgments about other cultures, it is entirely legitimate for researchers to adopt a stance of *methodological relativism*, which means suspending one's own beliefs and value judgments in order to give as fair and impartial description of another culture's beliefs and values as possible.

Methodological relativism is not the same as *normative relativism,* however.[4] Whereas the former is a normative stance about how research about cultural beliefs and values should be conducted, the latter is the normative stance that all cultural beliefs and values are equally valid. One implicit value orientation frequently found among those involved in intercultural studies is a form of cultural relativism which holds that people in intercultural situations should simply "understand and respect" other cultures. The idea is that cultural differences should be accepted as they are and, moreover, that any attempt to engage in critical reflection on the validity of different cultural practices should be avoided. This view is frequently supported by the philosophical argument that since there is no objective viewpoint outside of one's own culture from which other cultures can judged, no value judgments of other cultures can be made.

Such a stance is itself normative, however, because it implies that cultural differences *should* be understood and respected. While the admonition to understand and respect other cultures has the laudable intention of encouraging us to avoid ethnocentrism and to see other cultures on their own terms, it does not really tell us much about how we can actually work together, or even have dialogue, across cultures on problems of mutual concern. Simply saying that "you have your way of doing things and we have ours," even when based on mutual understanding and respect, precludes the possibility of actively creating common ground on which cooperation across cultures becomes possible. While understanding and respect may be important starting points in helping us to interact successfully with people from different cultures, they do not go far enough.

Constructive solutions to cross-cultural problems

How exactly might constructive solutions to cross-cultural problems be arrived at? Whereas empirical and theoretical studies in the field of intercultural relations are primarily concerned with giving an account of the world *as it is,* normative studies can be characterized as attempting to give an account of the world *as it might be*. By confining

themselves to a scientific consideration of the world as it is, empirical and theoretical approaches are by their very nature prevented from giving any consideration to solutions that do not already exist. Finding a normative solution to a problem, however, involves relying not only on observation and analysis, but also on the ability to imagine a future state in which the problem has been resolved. By opening up possibilities for a philosophical consideration of the world as it might be, normative approaches are able to offer solutions that may never have existed before or even been thought of.

Rather than simply observe and describe how things actually stand in the "real" world, a constructivist approach to problems that may arise when people from different cultures interact with each other attempts to envision "ideal" situations which provide models for how those problems might be successfully resolved. We need not remain captive to our existing cultural norms, but instead can imaginatively explore new solutions which are outside the framework of those norms. Such a move allows us to employ *divergent thinking* to brainstorm various possible solutions, and then to use *convergent thinking* to consider their potential results, choose which of the proposed solutions is best, implement the solution we have decided on, and then evaluate the results.

This reliance on the imagination may lead some to dismiss philosophical, normative approaches to intercultural interactions on the ground that they are merely "speculative," "impractical," "unrealistic," and outside the scope of "genuine" science. By sticking to the "cold, hard facts," more scientific approaches can be present themselves as being "grounded in reality" and, hence, more "practical." However, it can easily be seen, on the one hand, that simply sticking to the "cold, hard facts" in itself results in no solutions and, on the other, that attempts to imagine new solutions can lead to very practical results. Certainly normative solutions to concrete problems cannot be merely utopian; they must be capable of being actually implemented in the real world. The success of any proposed solutions can then be tested against the criteria of whether they are actually able to solve the problems at hand or not.

Even if an imagined solution cannot be implemented in its entirety, however, it may still be able to provide a standard by which progress can be measured. In the absence of such a standard, there is no reason why one course of action should be

preferred over any other. Every day school children in the United States recite the Pledge of Allegiance, which ends with the words: "with liberty and justice for all." In reality, of course, it is doubtful that liberty and justice are equally distributed in American society, given the deep divisions which remain between races, classes, and genders. But even if inequalities continue to exist as a matter of empirical fact, this does not mean that such inequalities are justified. By adopting "liberty and justice for all" as a normative standard, inequality is no longer something to be simply *accepted* as an empirical fact. Rather "liberty and justice for all" becomes an ideal which American society strives to *achieve*. Whenever reality falls short of this ideal, it does not mean that the ideal itself is worthless and that the situation should be cynically accepted as it is. Rather, it means that more work needs to be done if the ideal is to be realized to the fullest extent possible.

Note also that the formation of an "ideal" solution to a problem does not necessarily mean achieving the "best of all possible worlds" but simply the best that can be hoped for under a given set of actual circumstances. As these circumstances change entirely new ideals may be formulated to deal with them. Arriving at normative solutions in cross-cultural situations is not a matter of clinging to single absolute standards set in stone for all time, nor of simply respecting existing cultural norms, but rather a process of negotiation in which those who are affected by a problem jointly seek to solve it. No attempt need be made to formulate norms which are valid for all people in all places and at all times. Rather the norms are contextualized to resolve conflicts occurring among particular groups of people (from either the same or different cultures) dealing with particular problems in particular situations. There is no question here of one side simply trying to impose its values on the other; any norms which are constructed emerge out of the dialogical process itself.

Towards intercultural dialogue

The goal of a constructivist approach to intercultural philosophy is not to "impose" a particular way of thinking on others, but rather to consider how inclusive dialogue among people having different beliefs, values, and norms might be conducted. Although, as has been argued, good methodological reasons may be offered for attempting to maintain a measure of objectivity and avoiding value judgments in the

social sciences, a normative, philosophical approach to intercultural relations must explicitly concern itself with how value judgments and norms might be formulated, reasoned about, and justified across cultures. While it is permissible to offer arguments for why one normative position might be preferable to another, all such arguments can themselves be submitted to the dialogical process. To say that normative positions should be excluded from an intercultural dialogue is to miss the point; the whole purpose of cross-cultural dialogue is trying to understand each other's positions better or to determine what joint action *should* be taken to resolve the issue at hand. The normative positions themselves are part of the subject matter of the dialogue and there is no reason why they should be proscribed.

Intercultural philosophy may begin with an analysis of the background assumptions that the various parties bring with them to the dialogue process. It can then engage itself in the normative task of proposing criteria for evaluating the beliefs and values in question, as well as possible solutions for conflicts arising among people facing a mutual problem. The normative stage includes giving arguments for and against various proposals and subjecting them to public scrutiny and dialogue. It is precisely this willingness to subject our views to an open examination and discussion that, on the one hand, precludes the participants in a dialogue from obstinately clinging to their own views without argument or justification, and, on the other, prevents one side in a dialogue from imposing their views on others. While one side may or may not find the arguments of the other side to be persuasive, the only "force" that can be used in intercultural dialogue is the force of a better argument. Silencing the other side, by definition, means that the two sides are no longer having a dialogue with each other.

Finally, the inquiry may also consider *meta-normative* questions related to the communicative processes which enable people from different cultures to engage in dialogue on such questions. Meta-normative questions are concerned not with the *content* of what is being discussed, but rather with the *procedures* that enable normative claims to be co-constructed by the participants in an intercultural dialogue. While the people involved a dialogue must ultimately decide for themselves how the dialogue will be conducted, what criteria should be adopted, and how the problems themselves should be resolved, philosophy can at least help to clarify the options that are available.

To give a concrete example of this process, consider the kind of dialogue that may take place between an international developer who wants to develop resources in a particular area and the indigenous people who live there (the sub-theme of the movie, *Avatar*, incidentally). While the situation can be examined from a variety of empirical perspectives, including, economic, political, environmental, and other perspectives, it can also be analyzed from an ethical perspective, which is where a philosophy of intercultural relations makes its entrance as an area of inquiry. The normative question in this case is whether the land should be developed or not, and it is possible that arguments can be offered both for and against the plan not only from the economic, political, environmental perspectives mentioned above, but also from an ethical perspective. Meta-normative questions related to the problem might be: Who is included or excluded from discussions about the issue? What are the power relations between the participants in the dialogue? Who ultimately decides what should be done? What constitutes a fair decision? And more broadly: Should the values of economic development take precedence over the preservation of traditional cultures? Should attempts be made to integrate indigenous people into modern society or should they be free to continue their traditional ways of life if they so wish?

There are, of course, a variety of approaches that might be taken when engaging in meta-normative questions about how a dialogue should proceed. A universalist approach takes the view that there are certain absolute truths which should be accepted by everyone regardless of culture. Dialogue can be looked at the mutual search for such truths or simply as a matter of one side trying to convince the other that it already knows these truths. A relativist approach contends that there are no universal truths and that conflicting beliefs among different cultures may be incommensurable and thus, irreconcilable. If no ultimate standards can be appealed to help resolve such conflicts, one side must either give in arbitrarily to the other or the two sides separate, either amicably (agreeing to disagree) or unamicably (adopting hostile attitudes towards each other). A constructivist approach is to try to work through the disagreement in a manner that arrives at a solution which is mutually satisfactory to both sides, perhaps by reconfiguring the problem in a way that allows completely new ways of thinking and interacting to emerge. Rather than debate existing beliefs and trying to determine which

is "right," it may be possible for new solutions to be constructed as new problems arise, leading to the creation of entirely new cultural norms.

The dialogical process

It should be recognized, of course, that a constructivist approach to intercultural dialogue may not be applicable to all situations. In some cases persuasive arguments might be offered which in fact result in one side convincing the other side to change its view. In other cases, a majority view may not be implemented because of social, economic, or political oppression. In still other cases, the disagreements may run so deep that they are regarded as "intractable," and attention shifts away from conflict resolution towards conflict management, which involves trying to prevent a further escalation of the conflict and maintaining, to the extent possible, "peaceful coexistence," or towards conflict transformation, which involves trying to reframe the dispute in a way that can lead to either compromise or integrative, "win–win" situations, which effectively address the concerns of both sides. In such situations, other preliminary measures might need to be taken before the dialogical process can resume, such as increasing personal contacts between the disputants in non-threatening situations unrelated to the conflict ("people-to-people" diplomacy) or resolving other underlying political, economic, or security issues that impede dialogue.[5]

It should also be noted that people from different cultures often employ different communicative styles when engaging in intercultural dialogue, negotiations, and conflict resolution, as is evidenced by the extensive literature on these topics.[6] Western cultures, for example, frequently employ an "active" style of dialogue in which views are forcefully presented, argued for, and debated on an egalitarian basis in which each participant has equal power with all others (ideally at least). Following an Aristotelian either–or logic, it is assumed that one side will be "right" and the other "wrong." If the arguments that are presented fail to persuade all sides, a decision about which alternative to adopt might be made on the basis of majority rule. The minority may be obliged to go along with decisions made by the majority, but the minority also has the opportunity to bolster support for its position by offering arguments that may over time convince others to adopt it.

Asian cultures, on the other hand, often employ a "passive" style of dialogue in which views are indirectly presented and more attention is given to maintaining group harmony than to winning an argument; relationships between the participants may also be more hierarchical, with some people (experts or those in authority) being given more power in the communicative process. Following a more dialectical both–and logic the aim is reach an inclusive agreement which incorporates rather than rejects minority views. When successful, the result will be a consensus among all of the participants (ideally at least). If a consensus cannot be reached, a decision may be made to "table" the issue until a later date, giving all sides more time for reflection. Highly controversial issues may be avoided from the very start if they are perceived as being potentially disruptive to the functioning of the group.

What such considerations suggest is that attention needs to be paid not only to the topic under discussion but also the communicative processes that may be employed by people from different cultures when engaging in dialogue. In the same way that it cannot simply be assumed that everyone will share the same meta-normative assumptions about "truth," it cannot be assumed that everyone will share the same meta-normative assumptions about how a dialogue should be conducted. In other words, *everything* is open for negotiation. In trying to decide which communication processes to follow, should we adopt the universalist view that there is only one proper way of engaging in dialogue, or the relativist view that since each culture has their own communication style, there is no way for dialogue to proceed? Is the best that can be hoped for a bland recommendation to simply "understand" and "respect" differences in communication styles in the same way that we are advised to "understand" and "respect" the beliefs, values, and norms of other cultures? Ultimately, of course, such a stance offers no basis whatsoever for the two sides to actually engage in dialogue with each other, let alone address the substantive issues which brought them together in the first place.

While, indeed, it is possible to propose a priori "ground rules" for improving dialogue across cultures, it is often difficult to come up with a general list that can be agreed to by all sides and applied in all situations. An alternative, constructivist approach would suggest that it may nonetheless be possible for the two sides to *construct* an integrated communication style, which combines aspects of each of the original styles in

a way that both sides find acceptable. This constructive process begins not from a general set of normative rules laid out in advance for how communication should be conducted, but rather with the sets of rules that already exist, to see if from them new rules can be formulated which embrace both of the original sets and perhaps generate entirely new rules in the process. Both sides would be actively involved in the process of jointly creating the ground rules that they will ultimately agree to and follow. While success cannot always be guaranteed, the process may nonetheless be a possible way of moving forward when there are disagreements not only about the substantive issues under consideration but also about the manner in which they should be addressed.

To illustrate the process, we may return to our previous example. When Westerners and Asians are communicating with each other it may be possible for both sides to agree that stating positions directly and clearly is preferable to stating them indirectly and vaguely, given that an indirect, high context style is only understandable within cultural groups that use the style, whereas a direct, low context style is understandable to all groups. Nonetheless, the dialogue should be conducted in a manner which avoids interpersonal conflict and maintains group harmony, on the grounds that the ultimate goal of the dialogue may be to foster cooperation between the two groups in a way that enables them to work together successfully on problems of mutual concern. While everyone can freely engage in the dialogue on an equal basis, the views of experts should be actively consulted. This proposal preserves the Western norm that ideas should be debated on the basis of their merits rather than on the basis of authority (in some cases novices are "right" and the experts are "wrong"), but it also acknowledges that those having greater knowledge of a situation may in fact be able to contribute more than others to the resolution of a problem (experts may be "right" more often than they are "wrong" and "right" more often than novices). Arguments can be vigorously debated, as in the West, but the ultimate goal should be a substantive position that incorporates the views of minorities, as in the East. While it may be impossible to reach perfect consensus, a position may emerge which has greater support than one that could be decided on the basis of majority rule alone. Moreover, since even in the East there is rarely complete consensus on any given issue, the minority can still attempt to gain support for its view by trying to come up with more persuasive arguments in its favor.

Whether any of the above proposals are regarded as acceptable is something that ultimately needs to be decided by the people actually participating in a dialogue, not by philosophers. Nonetheless, the example does illustrate the kind of analysis that is possible from a constructivist perspective. In sum, intercultural philosophy has the potential to raise new questions and open up new areas of research in the field of intercultural relations, as well as to contribute to the resolution of problems that arise as a result of differences in cross-cultural norms.

Notes

[1]Recent works in English include Mall (2000) and Wallner, Schmidsberger, and Wimmer (2010).

[2]See Lacey (2005).

[3]Key texts on reflexivity include Bordieu and Wacquant (1992) and Clifford and Marcus (2010).

[4]For a general introduction to the various forms of relativism, see Baghramian (2014). Methodological relativism as it relates to anthropology is discussed by Hunt (2007).

[5]Bar-Tal (2013) analyzes intractable conflicts from a social science perspective, while Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (2005) adopt a more practical, normative approach. Conflict management is thoroughly treated in Pammer and Killian (2003). On conflict transformation, see Dumont, Hastings, and Noma (2013).

[6]Of the many books that look at dialogue, negotiations, and conflict resolution from a cross-cultural perspective, the following are good for starters: Avruch (2013), Chew (2001), European Commission (2004), Faure (2003), Fisher (1998), Grein and Weigand (2007), LeBaron (2003), Ting-Toomey and Oetzel (2001), UNESCO (2009), Weaver (2013).

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