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## REPORT ON THE ELECTIONS WATCH 4<sup>TH</sup> REGIONAL EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA ELECTION OBSERVERS CONFERENCE

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**THEME: Transnational Responses to Electoral Insecurity and Campaign Finance Monitoring**

**DATES: Thursday 6<sup>th</sup> May & Friday 7<sup>th</sup> May 2022**

**VENUE: Tamarind Tree Hotel, Lang'ata Link Road, Nairobi, Kenya**



**REPORT PREPARED BY SYLVIA KATUA**

**FOR THE EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA SECRETARIAT(E-HORN) &ELECTIONS OBSERVATION  
GROUP (ELOG)**

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACFIM	Alliance for Campaign Finance Monitoring
ARCISS	Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
CCEDU	Citizens' Coalition for Electoral Democracy (Uganda)
CCMG	Credible Transparent and Accountable Elections (Zambia)
CDD	Centre for Democratic Development (Ghana)
CODEO	Coalition of Domestic Election Observers
CTRH	Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing
E-HORN	East and Horn of Africa Election Observation Network
ELOG	Election Observation Group (Kenya)
EMB	Electoral Management Body
HLRF	High-Level Revitalization Forum
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IEBC	Independent and Electoral Boundaries Commission (Kenya)
IRI	International Republican Institute
KHRC	Kenya Human Rights Commission
NEC	National Elections Commission
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NEW	National Election Watch (Sierra Leone)
NUF	National Unify Forces
RTGoNU	Revitalized Government of National Unity
SADC	South African Development Community
SSUNDE	South Sudanese Network for Democracy and Elections (South Sudan)
SuGDE	Sudanese Group for Democracy and Elections
TEMCO	Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee
UDHR	Universal Declaration on Human Rights
WAEON	West Africa Election Observers Network
ZESN	Zimbabwe Election Support Network

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Convened against the backdrop of general elections that were conducted in Tanzania in 2020, Uganda, Ethiopia and Zambia in 2021, as well as upcoming elections in Kenya in August 2022 and South Sudan in 2023, the 4<sup>th</sup> E-Horn Regional Conference brought together regional stakeholders, actors and duty bearers to discuss impending electoral issues. The theme of the Conference was *'The Effect of Unregulated Campaign Finance and Insecurity on Electoral Integrity'* which focused on the key drivers and enablers of the high costs of political and campaign financing.

Implications of high campaign financing costs identified included the exclusion of qualified candidates from special interest groups, specifically women, youth and persons with disabilities (PWDs) from the political process and the resultant effect where those elected withhold proper and effective oversight of the use of resources as they seek to abuse their power.

In addition, the entrenchment of violence during the electoral period was canvassed deeply with interventions given to mitigate electoral violence, especially through peace messaging, behavioural change and sustained engagement with stakeholders. Throughout, the protection of electoral observers against electoral violence remained a key issue highlighted by participants.

The regional meeting therefore provided an opportunity for sharing experiences among E-Horn member countries as well drawing lessons for Kenya as it prepares for the August polls as well as for member countries for their electoral processes. To enhance peer learning, the E-HORN secretariat solicited the participation of other regional observation networks including South African Development Community (SADC) members and the West Africa Election Observers Network (WAEON).

Key recommendations that arose from the Conference were:

1. Development of homegrown solutions to regulate political financing that take into account the cultural, legal and practical context of the country (context matters).
2. Need for objective reporting by citizen observation platforms to improve the quality of election observation.
3. Civil Society Organizations and Observer platforms should enhance regional solidarity to support each other and lobby relevant duty-bearers to domesticate and comply with international standards and protocols.
4. There is need to develop minimum regional standards on election observation for purposes of clarity and uniformity across the region.

5. Thorough assessment and review of new frontiers such as internet shutdowns, social media spaces and hate speech.
6. Creation of a regional Scorecard to objectively assess the performance of duty-bearers during the electoral period.
7. Mainstreaming the inclusion agenda into observation missions.
8. Address long-standing electoral grievances and violations through affirmation of victims and continuously lobby for perpetrators to be brought to book.
9. Creation of a rubric to define and establish clear differences between electoral violence and other civil conflicts fueled by elections.
10. Lobbying and advocacy for definitive legal and regulatory frameworks on political financing.
11. Utilization of multi-dimensional interventions as civil society actors to mitigate electoral violence.
12. Leveraging on networks and coalitions such as E-HORN that have visibility and clout to influence Government and relevant electoral stakeholders.
13. Expansion of scope of election observation and observe different aspects of electoral processes; pre, during and post elections.
14. Lobbying and advocating for structured minimum standards and/or Regulations to ensure the security and safety of electoral observers.

## **BACKGROUND**

E-HORN is a regional network of citizen election observer groups in the East and Horn of Africa. E-HORN network draws its membership from 5 countries in the East and Horn of Africa region; Citizens' Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda - CCEDU (Uganda), South Sudanese Network for Democracy and Elections - SSUNDE (South Sudan), Sudanese Group for Democracy and Elections - SuGDE (Sudan), Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee - TEMCO (Tanzania), Kenya Human Rights Commission - KHRC, and Elections Observation Group - ELOG (Both Kenya).

E-HORN was inaugurated in 2013 during a meeting in which participants from the 7 Eastern African countries were represented. These countries, namely; Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya were represented by the above Citizen Election Groups intent on forming a regional network for solidarity and experience sharing. Apart from this meeting in which the ELOG regional council was formed, the E-HORN has held 3 regional conferences in 2013, 2014 and 2018. This conference was therefore the 4<sup>th</sup> meeting of the regional network.

### **THEME: “THE EFFECT OF UNREGULATED CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND INSECURITY ON ELECTORAL INTEGRITY.”**

Elections are the most manifest tenets of a progressive democracy in the world. Elected and aspiring officials must return to the voters at prescribed intervals and seek their mandate to continue in office. For that reason, most democratic constitutions provide that elections be held at fixed regular intervals. Nonetheless, holding regular elections alone is not a marker for democratic progress.

As a fundamental human right, an election needs to be credible, free and fair and further conducted in a transparent, inclusive, accountable and competitive manner. Consequently, the true test of a credible election goes beyond who wins at the ballot and includes how the entire process was conducted and procured.

Citizens have a right to take part in government and the conduct of public affairs of their countries. They have a right to vote and to be elected in periodic elections without discrimination. The will of the people, expressed through their ballots, provides the basis of authority for any democratic government. A credible free and fair election lends legitimacy to an elected government and mitigates conflict in the event of a disputed electoral result outcome.



These concepts are enshrined in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other international and regional human rights instruments. They are central to the principle that elections belong to the people and are key features of any genuine democracy.

A quick scan of the political analysis of the E-Horn region shows that many of the electoral processes in the region remain off-course. Among the many factors that have contributed to this situation are the unregulated use of money by aspirants and political parties in the electoral campaigns as well as the continued threat of insecurity by governmental agencies such as the police and other non- state actors who include sponsored militia and digital hackers.

In that regard, in line with the Conference theme, the regional meeting therefore provided an opportunity for sharing experiences among E-Horn member countries as well drawing lessons for Kenya as it prepares for the August polls as well as for member countries for their electoral processes. To enhance peer learning, the E-HORN secretariat solicited the participation of other regional observation networks including South African Development Community (SADC) members and the West Africa Election Observers Network (WAEON).

The overall conference objectives were to:

- a) Promote sharing of experiences in the spirit of collegiality and peer learning from member organizations;
- b) Strengthen the capacity of member organizations to observe and monitor elections in their respective countries through proposal of practical and actionable recommendations and;
- c) Enhance solidarity and partnership amongst network members to support conduct of democratic elections in East and Horn of Africa.



## Day 1 Proceedings: Thursday, 5<sup>th</sup> May 2022

### Opening of the Session

The Conference began at 9am, with the narration of the Kenya National Anthem and the East Africa Anthems. The session was moderated by Mr. Marcus A. Ageng'a, Senior Program Manager at the Election Observation Group (ELOG). Thereafter, all participants were asked to introduce themselves before being taken through the programme and the expectations of the Conference.



### Welcoming Remarks

***Anne W. Ileri, Chairperson of the Election Observation Group (ELOG) & Executive Director, Federation of Women Lawyers Kenya (FIDA-K)***



Ms. Ileri welcomed participants to Nairobi. She expressed her delight and pleasure at hosting the Regional Conference and relayed heartfelt appreciation to the participants for their presence at the Conference on behalf of the E-HORN Secretariat. In her opening remarks she stated that ideally elections should be a celebration of human rights, however she noted that conversely in the region elections have instead become a negative expression of the

same. Consequently it was therefore encouraging to see regional civic groups convene to deliberate on the administration and management of electoral processes within the region. She recognized the E-Horn Members, noting that the conference was being held against the backdrop of general elections that were conducted in Tanzania in 2020, Uganda, Ethiopia and

Zambia in 2021, as well as upcoming elections in Kenya in August 2022 and South Sudan in 2023.

Ms. Ireri encouraged participants to take advantage of the regional meeting and share reflections, explore key drivers of the cost of unregulated election campaign funding on democracy and security, learn from the different country experiences, and to ultimately challenge and support each other. She finalized by thanking the partners, specifically the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) for their partnership and collaboration towards making the conference a reality.

***Jessica Keegan, Election Integrity Advisor, Centre for Global Impact International Republican Institute***

Ms. Keegan conveyed the International Republican Institute's delight towards supporting the 4<sup>th</sup> E-Horn Conference that brought together likeminded Regional stakeholders seeking to find solutions to thwart electoral anomalies. She emphasized that safeguarding electoral integrity, a critical aspect



of democratic systems, now more than ever, merits focused attention, consensus, and coordinated approaches to thwart electronic anomalies that have the potential to disenfranchise populations, disrupt political processes and hinder electoral institutions' ability to respond. She expounded that with funding from the National Endowment for Democracy, IRI was examining existent and emerging threats to electoral integrity and developing new frameworks for assessing the quality and conduct of elections. Further, IRI was also working hand in hand to support the initiatives in addition to citizen observers throughout the continent, which is why leaders of citizen observer networks, as the vanguards for clean elections, were present in the Conference.

Ms. Keegan also underlined that the session was held in the spirit of transnational collaboration, to exchange dialogue and to think strategically among peers about the ways that election observers can better carry out their work. She concluded by thanking the ELOG and E-Horn Secretariats for the great work they had done in convening the Conference.

## Opening Remarks

### *Chrispin Kaheru, Chairperson of the East and Horn of the Africa Election Observers Network*



He started off his remarks by stating the last Regional Conference held was in 2018 and that was special as it was when he was elected to chair E-Horn. Therefore, the Conference came at a time when E-Horn is closing in on its 9<sup>th</sup> year of existence. He thanked each of the members and partners that had supported E-Horn thus far.

He noted that the Conference was convened against the backdrop of what seems to almost be the post-Covid 19 pandemic. Mr. Kaheru urged the respective member countries to reflect on the past elections in region; Tanzania in 2020, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Zambia in 2021, which presented new and unique challenges. Lessons from those elections on civic engagement, human rights, media and elections, demographic considerations and technology in elections should guide the participants to creatively think about how to make contributions to steady growth of bilateral democracy in their respective societies.

Additionally, he indicated that the growing trend and repercussions of elections for the haves and the disenfranchisement of the have nots was very worrying. In light of that, he urged the participants to think critically about how to enhance E-Horn's capacity as a bloc and how to offer a learning platform and crucial for member local observer groups. That way, he stated, not only would it guarantee respect for the will of the people, but also be the path of growth of better democracies. In closing, he officially commissioned the opening of the ceremony.

### **Presentation: Political Economy Analysis (PEA) of the East and Horn of Africa Region**

## Mulle Musau, Coordinator, E-HORN Regional Coordinator and National Coordinator E-LOG

He began his presentation by welcoming the participants to Nairobi and commending them for their continued concerted efforts in promoting electoral integrity across the region. He set the context and stage by taking the delegates through the regional status quo. He began by highlighting that the region had 3 elections within the last two years (Tanzania (2020), Uganda and Ethiopia (2021). Kenya was set to hold its elections (9th August 2022) while Sudan and South Sudan were poised to hold elections in 2023.



### Regional Context

In terms of a broad regional context, he explained that in Africa, two presidential elections had been nullified, that was Kenya in 2017 and Malawi in 2020 as a result of election irregularities and illegalities. There had also not been a guarantee of electoral integrity in most of the elections conducted. This led to what he termed as a “reversal of democratic gains”: elections are no longer people-driven and ultimately, the right leadership is not getting into power. He noted that this could be seen through shambolic party primaries that take place across the region and which could be exemplified by Kenya. For instance, he pointed out that key word in Kenya’s current party primaries was ‘**consensus-building**’. Here, the party leadership would meet and select candidates for their strongest areas leading to a lot of agitation. In his own words, “*Where the people are supposed to participate in the franchise or in the discussion of who their leader should be, whether it is through the political party or through the election process, that is being taken away by an elite conspiracy of the main actors.*”





He expounded that a lack of electoral integrity had been characterized by delayed elections as was seen in Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia. Governmental interference in Tanzania and Uganda affecting the observation of the process in-country as well as the harassment of Electoral Management Body officials in Kenya constituted a violation of electoral integrity. Mr. Mulle went on to further to highlight a new risk: the increased securitization of electoral processes through increased police and military

presence with the sole objective of creating an intimidating environment and unnecessary fear.

He stated that among the key contributors to this trajectory are unregulated campaign finance and spending as well as the continued threat of insecurity. Giving an example of Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), he remarked that they held some of the most expensive elections in the world in terms of public expenditure.

### **The problem of unregulated money in regional elections**

He stated that the biggest threat to electoral integrity in Africa is campaign finance. He gave an example of Kenya where for one to run a successful election for the position of Member of Parliament (MP), one required between \$20,000 - \$25,000. Consequently, the prohibitive cost of running for office presented challenges to participatory electoral democracy.

Dubious sources of the campaign financing should be a cause of worry for election observers in a region where there is endemic Government corruption, terrorism and interference from foreign governments. He thus challenged participants to ask “*Who pays the piper?*” The abuse of incumbency to easily access public resources for pilferage and campaign purposes also tilted the scales in the incumbents’ favour and therefore not providing a fair opportunity to all. This stemmed also from the fact that most countries in the region do not have robust legal frameworks to address campaign financing.

### **Electoral Insecurity**

Issues of violence, insecurity and intimidation persisted in the region before, during and after the elections. Where protests took place in the region, restrictions were promptly enforced as was the case in Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia.

He also emphasized that the explosion and rapid adoption of the digital space has also brought its own challenges relating to electoral insecurity such as hacking/manipulation of electronic proposes, social media hate speech, cyber bullying and restricted access to social media. Using the example of Uganda where the EMB invited aspirants to leverage on the digital space to conduct campaigns, Mr. Mulle invited participants to scrutinize the digital space as an area at high risk of insecurity. The influence of social media has also invited Government clampdowns. For example:

- Uganda shut down access to the internet in the run up to its presidential elections in 2021.
- Tanzania restricted access to the internet and social media applications during elections in 2020.
- Ethiopia imposed a month-long internet shut down following the killings of a prominent Oromo activist.

### Key Considerations and Conclusions

In outlining the key considerations for the participants, Mr. Mulle stated that:

- While there have been considerable improvements in management and conduct of elections in the region over the past 10 years, challenges relating to electoral integrity and credibility still remain.
- The key to enhancing electoral integrity and credibility lies in focusing on the entire electoral cycle. Political finance regulation, security of the elections and the independence of the EMB are especially crucial.
- EMBs in the region must work in concert with other actors to ensure integrity and credibility of electoral processes. These include other government agencies, parliaments, political parties, the media and civil society organizations.



- Effective and robust legal framework on campaign finance regulation need to be in place to curb increasing influence of money in elections.
- Security platforms to support peaceful electioneering through multi stakeholder engagement and implementation of human rights-based approach to electoral security.
- EMBs need to play a central role in electoral security since it is they who manage the processes.

In closing, he expressed hope that the participants would garner knowledge and share experiences from respective member countries and the expert presentations.

## **PANEL SESSION**

### **Money in Elections: Perspectives from East, West and Southern Africa**

**Keynote: Henry Muguzi**, Executive Director, Alliance for Campaign Finance Monitoring (ACFIM)

**Moderator: Jessica Keegan**, Election Integrity Advisor, Centre for Global Impact International Republican Institute

#### **Discussants**

1. **Dr. Kojo Asante**, Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD)/ Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO)-Ghana
2. **Ellen Dingane**, Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN)-Zimbabwe
3. **Marcus Ageng'a**, Elections Observation Group (ELOG)-Kenya



**Presentation; Money in Elections: Perspectives from East, West, and Southern Africa**  
**Is African politics well insulated against the corrosive impact of unregulated money in politics/elections? - HENRY MUGUZI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ALLIANCE FOR FINANCE MONITORING (ACFIM)**



Henry Muguzi began his presentation by stating that the continent had some of the most corrupt countries in the world and that unregulated money in elections presented a plethora of challenges to participatory democracy on the continent. Put bluntly he stated that *“corruption and political finance are almost bedfellows.”* His presentation highlighted the extent of

commercialization of politics in Africa, he cited Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria as examples.

In Uganda, money influenced voter consent in 2021. As a result, the entire electoral process was not a reflection of the people’s will but a reflection of the power of money. On the other hand he stated that, Kenyan aspirants engaged in a mad rush to hire or even buy helicopters to gain political clout with the electorate. Meanwhile in Nigeria, the electorate must be paid to attend any campaign event / rally.

According to his analysis, the monetization and commercialization of politics has led to the detriment of democratic progression. African democracies were plagued with ‘pay as you go politics’, edging out qualified aspirants and leaving the arena for those who have access to sizeable resources.

To gain better perspective on the cause effect of monetization and commercialization of campaign finance and spending, he delved into the types and sources of campaign finance. According to his survey political parties were primarily funded through private financing. Political Parties would fundraise from diverse sources , this however presented challenges where the parties pay citizens to be members instead of them subscribing voluntarily. This created the endemic party patronage culture where a political party became individual enterprise to serve the private interests of those who donate generously instead of adopting a national democratic outlook .

To counter this, he proposed public funding for political parties from the exchequer, where the National Government allocated funding to political parties that have met certain minimum

thresholds. However, concerns regarding the mechanisms/institutions that may hold the political parties accountable to the highest standards lingered because of the potential to create room for the abuse and mismanagement of the funds by political parties in the absence of proper oversight and accountability.

Based on the foregoing he proposed that a regulatory framework for political financing for African countries be developed , he presented the following issues to buttress his proposal;-

- **Controlled Voter Consent and civic disengagement**  
Due to the commodification of politics, voter consent remains elusive, and citizens feel disengaged from the electoral process. This leads to a state coined as ‘captured democracy.’
- **Persistence of Voter Bribery**  
Candidates who spent more to induce voters, on average, compared to their counterparts, won elections.
- **Misuse of State Resources by Incumbents**  
Use of incumbency by public officers to raid State coffers for funding of political campaigns raises concerns as to the state of public resources.
- **Run-away Political Corruption**  
African countries have become safe havens for money laundering and thus, corruption has become a means to easily gain access to political office.
- **Executive Enrichment & State Capture**  
Runaway political corruption has become entrenched in the Office of the President and other government offices which have consequently become centers for clearing deals. The issue of executive enrichment and state capture is also present in many countries such as in Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan where politicians are the richest people in the country and own most of the properties.

When democracy is captured:

- Government benefits a small number of individuals or powerful groups
- Elections become a reflection of the power of money
- Electorate begins to believe that democracy did not serve their interests
- Taxation policies that increase poverty become more common
- Proceeds from predicate financial crimes find their way into financing elections

Despite all these threats to democracy, ruling parties are reluctant to legislate on campaign financing. In most African countries, legislative proposals for electoral campaign financing are often postponed to the next Parliament.

To that end, this has meant that women, youth and small political parties are locked out and



cannot compete fairly, as the electoral process becomes a preserve of those who have access to money. The lack of openness and transparency in campaign financing allows dirty money to find its way into elections. Further, the growing voter perception is that they have a right to be bribed and must be bribed.

Accordingly, Africa must develop homegrown solutions to curb monetization and commercialization of electoral politics. Additionally, tough questions on where the funds come from and what those who invest such large amounts of money expect back need to be asked.

### Key Panel Highlights

#### Ms. Ellen Dingani - Zimbabwe Election Support Network(ZESN)

During the panel session panelists shared perspectives from their respective countries in relation to core issues of concern on campaign finance and spending. With regard to the kind of legal or regulatory framework that existed and how campaign corruption manifested itself in Zimbabwe, Ms. Ellen Dingani from the Zimbabwe Election



Support Network(ZESN) informed the panel that campaign financing was regulated by the Electoral Act and the Political Parties (Finance) Act [Chapter 2:11]. Despite legislation on the same she noted that there were gaps in the regulation of political party financing and

spending, this was compounded by the transient nature of political parties which were formed close to elections with the sole purpose of obtaining political power. There was no mechanism to regulate political party campaign financing and spending. It was also noted that there was little or no appetite to legislate on the same.

On the issue of how campaign corruption manifested itself she stated that the *condicio sine qua non* was the private funding of political parties by prominent businessmen and foreigners who thereafter had key influence in legal and policy making. The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) drafted a Bill with a proposal to have the EMB register political parties in Zimbabwe is a bid to regularize the process . Ms. Dingani posited that corruption in Zimbabwe was fueled by lack of enforcement of laws and regulations on political funding.

**Dr. Kojo Pumpuni Asante - Director of Advocacy and Policy Engagement**  
***The Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana)***



Dr. Kojo Pumpuni Asante from The Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) shared perspectives from Ghana, he stated that the law did not allow foreign funding of political parties and that only citizens and corporates can donate to political parties in addition political parties are required to submit audited accounts at least 6 months post-elections. However, there existed no mechanism to ensure implementation. It was also highlighted that political candidates were not required to declare their sources of funding or disclose their

expenditures. To illustrate the high campaign costs, Dr. Asante stated that there had been a 57% increase in campaign expenditures between 2012 and 2017, with rough figures in 2017 being about \$85,000. In 2021, it was estimated to be about \$300,000. It was further revealed that the costs increased after each successive election, this trend was directly attributed to illegal small-scale financing through illegal fishing, cutting and smuggling of rosewood trees and procurement fraud & manipulation.



In the plenary session, participants raised questions on proposals for homegrown solutions, best way to fund elections and how to enforce campaign limits. It was suggested that the development of a multi-stakeholder forum between the Electoral Management Body and political parties to regulate political financing. Further, legislation should



be enacted in line with the African context, such as placing caps on contributions at funerals and churches could also control irregular financing. There were also calls for ensuring the onus was on both sides, the aspirants and the electorate. Lastly, civil society organizations were encouraged to continue with efforts of building an active citizenry.

#### **SITUATION REPORTS FROM EHORN MEMBERS**

##### **Ethiopia – Abera Hailemariam, Coalition of Ethiopian Civil Society Organisation for Election (CECOE)**

In giving the country context, Mr. Hailemariam contextualized the political arena in Ethiopia in 2021 three parts. First, the elections were conducted amidst the ravaging effects of Covid-



19. Secondly, rifts between ruling party and the opposition parties and amongst the opposition political parties themselves. Thirdly, the war between Northern Region and federal governments had serious implications on the electoral process. Further, the Electoral Management Body (EMB) was new in office, and thus had no experience. Lastly, the election CSO network was formed in 2019 and also did not have the necessary experience and expertise to conduct electoral observation.

Despite all this, the network managed to deploy 3,365 observers for both the June and September elections. They were also able to monitor public and private media on reporting and dissemination of information. The observation was implemented systematically, but

because of the postponements in some areas, observers were not able to be deployed proportionally. This was the first time to conduct this type of observation. They also established situation rooms to receive information via SMS. Continuous release of press statements and posts kept the public informed.

Challenges faced included insecurity in specific regions, delays in accreditation of observers, repeated postponements of the elections and limited staff to undertake observations. Overall, the observers succeeded in reporting and their findings were that the election was peaceful, with the highest turnout ever seen.

### **Somalia – Asha Siyad, Somali Women’s Leadership Initiative(SWLI)**

Ms. Siyad stated that the incumbent President was elected on 8<sup>th</sup> February 2017. The next elections set for 2020 were postponed due to insecurity from Al Shabaab and political disagreement among the political class. She stated that Somalia was yet to hold a one man one vote election since 1968 and that the President was elected indirectly by members of parliament . She also noted that parliament had rejected the concept of one man one vote despite the EMB expressing readiness to conduct the same. Somalia was set to hold elections on 15<sup>th</sup> May 2022 through indirect representation by parliament.



She gave a brief history of Somalia’s governance , and reiterated that Somalia was yet to hold a one man one vote election and the last time Somalia had an election based on universal suffrage was in 1968. No sooner was the President was elected, than he was assassinated. Thereafter, military officials took power until they were ousted in 1991. The opposition could not agree on the next leadership and civil war broke out. Consequently, between 1991 and 2000, there was no Government. Thereafter, the United Nations and the international community moved to form an interim Government. In 2012, a legitimate government was formed. Thus, universal suffrage may be realized in 2025.

### **South Sudan - James Okony, South Sudan Network for Democracy and Elections (SSuNDE)**

South Sudan gained independence on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2011. However, a conflict broke out on 15<sup>th</sup> December 2013. As a result, a peace agreement known as Agreement on the Resolution of

Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCISS) was signed in August 2015 in Addis Ababa. In 2016, The Government of National Unity was formed but fighting erupted again in July 2016. Following this, on 12<sup>th</sup> June 2017, IGAD established the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) and launched it in December 2017.

Subsequent to this, the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCISS) was signed in August 2018 and the Revitalized Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) was formed in 22 February 2020. On 19 October 2021, the Permanent Constitution-making Process Bill 2021 was approved by the RTGoNU Council of Ministers.

Some of the challenges & delays in the Implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement



highlighted were: a number of skirmishes going on, defection of forces among the parties to R-ARCISS, community-based violence and the Government funding for the security sector as stipulated in the R-ARCISS, including the priorities for allocation, accountability and transparency remains wanting. The Graduation of National Unify Forces (NUF) has yet to also take place. In addition, South Sudan has continued to suffer the effects of multiple shocks that adversely

affected the humanitarian situation. There have been reports of continued sexual and gender-based violence in different parts of the country being reported by aid agencies and both international and local media outlets.

With respect to elections, the reconstitution of a competent and independent National Elections Commission (NEC) is yet to done and the requisite legal framework is not yet put in place. Further, the National Population and Housing Census before the end of the Transitional Period has not been undertaken.

In that regard, the following recommendations were advanced:

- Dissemination of the agreement to the wider South Sudanese population in order to create ownership, encourage trust-building, and enhance citizens' participation in its implementation.



- Graduation of the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF) to implement the security sector reforms as per the R-ARCSS.
- Adequate and transparent allocation of oil revenue for smooth implementation of the revitalized peace agreement.
- The parties to the R-ARCSS and the other stakeholders should embark on trauma healing, social re-integration and recovery programs for South Sudanese including voluntary returnees from the IDP Camps as well those from the refugee camps.
- The parties to the R-ARCSS must expedite the process of incorporating the R-ARCSS into the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan as stipulated in the agreement.
- The TRGoNU should expedite the establishment of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA) and Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS).
- IGAD, AU, UN and the TROIKA should work and collaborate together to devise means and approaches to continue putting pressure on the parties to agreement to implement the R-ARCSS in good faith.
- The RTGoNU should conduct the national population and housing census so as to allow for the establishment of the various constituencies at all levels that are necessary for the conduct of general elections.
- Reconstitution of independent National Elections Commission (NEC).
- Considering the analysis above and observing the implementation of the R-ARCSS for the last two years by RTGoNU, it is fair to conclude that the peace agreement has not fulfilled its mandate of delivering peace and instituting the highly needed institutional reforms to serve the citizens of South Sudan.

### **Uganda –Faridah Lule, Citizen’s Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU)**

The preparation for General Elections commenced in 2017 with a review of the Commission Strategic Plan (2013–2017), a reflection on the previous elections, and subsequent development of the Commission Strategic Plan (2015/16 – 2020/21) and the 2020/2021 General Elections Roadmap. The Roadmap to the General Elections was wholly funded by the Government of Uganda through the Consolidated Fund to a total of Ugx.698.656Bn (Uganda Shillings Six Hundred Ninety-Eight Billion Six Hundred



Fifty-Six Million Only) in a phased manner, that is Ugx.140.986Bn in FY 2019/2020 and Ugx.557.670Bn in FY 2020/2021.

Elections in Uganda were conducted in 2021. The polling day activities were generally conducted in a peaceful atmosphere and the counting of votes cast for each candidate was done at the respective polling stations. A copy of the Declaration of Results (DR) Form, customized per elective position was given to agents of each candidate and also delivered to the designated results collection centres for onward transmission to the Electoral District Returning Officers for the tallying process.

Uganda's presidential election was preceded by weeks of government-sponsored violence; the arrest of opposition candidates; the kidnapping of party and campaign staff held at undisclosed military locations. There was repeated arrest of opposition leaders, killings by security personnel of at least 54 protesters and bystanders between November 18<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> 2020, and the wounding and mutilation of Ugandans. Such violence was also accompanied by the arrest and detention of lawyers and CSOs. Further, there was extensive evidence of election tampering, pre-marking of ballots for certain candidates, ballot-stuffing, coercion of voters by the military, use of money, internet shutdown on election day; and illegal casting of votes before voters arrived at polling stations, reports of 100%, 99%, and 98% voter turnout. Throughout, the independence of the commission was put to the test.



The Presidential slot showed an increase of 37% (8 to 11 nominated candidates), Parliamentary 54.2% (from 1,816 to 2,801) and Local Government Council 125% (39,684 to 89,319). Several the aspirants were nominated as independent candidates, that is 54.5% (6 out of 11 Presidential Candidates), 51% (1,045 out of

2,043 Directly Elected MPs), 48% (312 out of 653 District/City Women Representatives to Parliament) and 34% (30,077 out of 89,319 for Local Government Councils). The Commission used an Election Results Transmission and Dissemination System (ERTDS) to tally election results at the District and transmitted Presidential election results from the District to the National Tally Centre, at Kyambogo University Sports Ground, Kampala. Political Parties/ Organisations/ Candidates' representatives, Observers, the Media and other stakeholders

instantaneously viewed election results on screens as they were being received and tallied at respective tally Centres across the country.

The Country encountered some challenges including:

- The onset of COVID-19 resulting in the delayed implementation of some activities within the set timelines;
- Late creation of new administrative units long after the electoral Roadmap had been released;
- Late enactment of electoral laws and attendant regulations;
- Untimely funding of planned activities;
- Late resolution of complaints arising from political parties/organizations primaries; and
- Low turn up of voters during the local government council elections and inadequate funding to implement electoral activities.

As to the role of CSOs in the process, most CSOs missed out on observing elections and supporting voter education. The accreditation process for both activities became so complex and detailed for CSOs to meet the requirements. Voters were left at the mercy of the Commission yet the Commission itself was also struggling to roll out sufficient voter education despite the need due to Covid-19 guidelines. Moreover, some organizations were suspended indefinitely after the elections.

### **Tanzania - Abella Bayetunga, Tanzania Bora Initiative (TBI)**

The 2020 Tanzania general election happened in a context where young people and women formed the majority population. The NEC data for the 2020 general election demonstrated that the number of female voters was slightly higher at 50.33% compared to male voters (49.67%). The 2020 election results depict that out of the 264 parliamentary seats, women won



25 constituency seats. An additional 113 women got to the Parliament through women special seats MPs- 94 from CCM and 19 from CHADEMA. The number of women in parliament remained at 37% with no increase from the 2015 general election. It was also noted that 50:50 men and women representation has been achieved at the presidential level-a winning

President being a man who ran alongside a female running mate who automatically becomes Vice President.

Civic space was noted to have been shrinking, repressive media laws were enacted and ruthlessly implemented and many ‘traditional’ observers were denied accreditation. Despite this, a female President later took up the mantle giving a much-needed push towards the representation of women in leadership, following the death of President Magufuli.

In relation to what was observed during the elections, intimidation and harassment occurred in some sections of the country. There was also violence outside some polling stations and instances of ballot stuffing reported.

Some of the recommendations put forward were:

- An easy and accessible online accreditation system which allows bulk upload for accreditation of organizations and individuals should be set up by NEC in advance of the next elections.
- Make available on the NEC website all information pertaining to candidates, candidate nomination processes and outcomes, voters, election process and results.
- Youth-focused and youth-based organizations should see themselves as front runners for applying to conduct election observation, with a strong mandate for focusing on youth issues and youth engagement.
- CSOs should engage the media in a more systematic and creative way in order to engage with different demographic groups, especially young men and women.

### **Marcus A. Ageng’a- Elections Observation Group (ELOG) Kenya**

Since the last General Elections in 2017, ELOG has sustained its visibility and presence. Through the support of partners, ELOG has now devolved to 10 regions. It has also put in place systems and structures to observe elections through other local partners. ELOG has also continued to be called upon and to convene various stakeholders to have crucial conversations on the electoral process.

In terms of challenges, there have been financial challenges and the high



turnover of observers. This has affected permanence and the community of observers. Following the nullification of the Presidential election in 2017, ELOG came under close and strict scrutiny. There are also challenges as to speaking to the entirety of the entire process. Security of observers has also been a key consideration that requires further concerted action by electoral stakeholders.

-----End of Day 1 Proceedings -----



## Day 2 Proceedings: Friday, 6<sup>th</sup> May 2022

### Opening Remarks

**Regina Opondo, ELOG**

Ms. Opondo welcomed participants for the second day of the Conference and provided a brief recap of the previous day's proceedings. She summarized the Panel Session and discussions by highlighting a few key issues. She went over some of the recommendations from the panel session (Money in Elections) and noted that it was agreed that Africa must develop homegrown solutions to regulate political financing, taking into consideration their unique contexts. The experiences from Zimbabwe and Ghana also showed that there needs to be a definitive legal and regulatory framework on political financing and further, strengthened implementation.

In that regard, she wished participants fruitful discussions in the upcoming conversations for the day and expressed gratitude for their support and presence.

### Panel Session

#### **Electoral Violence: Perspectives from East, West and Southern Africa**

Moderator: Dr. Patrick Quirk, Senior Director Centre for Global Impact IRI

#### **Panellists**

1. **Peter Mwanangombe**, Christian Churches Monitoring Group (CCMG)- Zambia
2. **James Lahai**, National Election Watch (NEW)- Sierra Leone
3. **Peter Kiama**, Independent Medical Legal Unit (IMLU)-Kenya
4. **Prakhar Sharma**, Senior Researcher, International Republican Institute

## Key Panel Highlights

### Dr. Patrick Quirk, Senior Director Centre for Global Impact IRI



The session focused on electoral violence in African countries, its ramifications and sought to fashion actionable solutions and interventions for adoption by both relevant Government electoral agencies and civil society organizations. In the conversation, electoral violence was broadly defined as the use of physical harm, intimidation, blackmail, verbal abuse, violent demonstrations, psychological manipulation, or other coercive tactics aimed at exploiting, disrupting, determining, hastening,

delaying, reversing, or otherwise influencing an electoral process and its outcomes.

The panellists noted that electoral violence had become entrenched and pervasive in many electoral seasons across due to political intolerance and the neglectful conduct of security forces, mandated to ensure the peace and security of not only the voters, but also the observers. It was agreed that there should be clear differences between election violence and political violence.

### Peter Mwanangombe, Christian Churches Monitoring Group (CCMG)- Zambia

Mr. Mwanangombe emphasized the necessity of entrenching civic education in secondary schools and to also have reasonable incentives for young people. This would allow youth to be more meaningfully involved and engaged in strategic planning and designing for electoral interventions. It will allow young people to understand their roles and responsibilities and that of the State. This will be a good way to increase and broaden the meaningful participation of young people in electoral and wider political processes. He also stressed on





the need to develop early warning and response systems and gave the example of CCMG which observes a number of by-elections and identifies trends that are useful.

On the part of Mr. Lahai, he began by expanding the scope of violence and noting that it also included mental violence and intimidation. He noted that over time, strategies have been adopted by various Government and State actors to perpetrate violence in a bid to skew the outcomes of elections to their advantage and to deny the choice of the people to come into play. The sole objective was therefore to attack the integrity of the entire electoral process. As he was representing West Africa in the discussion, he highlighted cases of electoral violence in the region. Cote D'Ivoire in 2010, Nigeria in 2011, Mali and Guinea have experienced these incidences.

### **James Lahai, National Election Watch (NEW)- Sierra Leone**



Mr. Lahai explained the key challenge in mitigating electoral violence was that it was difficult to determine whether violence would erupt and what the true cause of the violence was. Before the growth of democracy and the advent of election observation in West Africa, political candidates would ensure that violence was centred during the political party nomination period. He further underscored that the reason for

the use and perpetration of violence was because the stakes are high. Access to political office has meant that one has access to State resources and unfettered political power at their will. Through all this, the most affected people are women and persons with disabilities.

In Sierra Leone, observers have come under attack as the perpetrators of violence do not want to be captured on camera. He recommended that a way to protect election observers was to place and recruit them from their local communities and they are more perceptible to gauge when violence would occur. The guiding principle is '*Report the news, don't be the news.*'

## **Peter Kiama, Independent Medical Legal Unit (IMLU)-Kenya**

Mr. Kiama challenged the participants to think differently. He noted that the conversation had focused extensively on the perpetrators, but what about the victims? How would local civil society organisations and election observers assist and support victims of violence? He pointed out that it was our work to affirm the grievances of victims. Secondly, he questioned the notion of a final verdict as an Observer Group, bringing to the fore that such averments create differences in observer groups. It was recommended



that the observer group should agree in totality at the beginning of the Observer Mission on what the end result would consist definitively. Lastly, he encouraged election observers to rethink pushing for reconciliation post-violence as it legitimized electoral violence.

## **Keynote Speech**

**Mr. Chrispin Owiye, Director Legal & Public Affairs, presented the keynote speech on behalf of the Chairperson of the IEBC, Mr. Wafula Chebukati**

On behalf of the Chairperson of the IEBC, Mr. Owiye began by recognizing the impact of unregulated political financing on the electoral landscape. In his words, he noted, *“While there are many factors that contribute to political inequality such as discrimination and exclusionary politics, none is as notorious as the negative impact of unregulated finance on politics and governance. It is one of the biggest hindrances to credible, transparent and inclusive, democratic processes.”*

In that regard, he highlighted that there was need for regulatory standards to prevent and fight against the phenomenon of corruption, while at the same time ensuring democratic participation and the realization of fundamental human rights and freedoms. He noted that regulation takes the form of spending limits which seek to limit the amounts spent by candidates and political parties. However, if the limits were set too high, they would only be meaningless. On the other hand, low spending limits may curtail candidates’ campaigns or they may find creative ways to circumvent.

He provided a brief history and legislative of the regime of election campaign financing in Kenya together with the overarching objectives and standards of the Regulations. He noted the unfortunate situation that IEBC had been placed in, through the suspension of the Regulations by the National Assembly, had left an unlevel playing ground. However, recent pronouncements from the High Court had provided relief to the IEBC to regulate political financing without interference from the National Assembly.

### **Press Conference**

The E-HORN Council members issued a press statement to address key issues that emerged during deliberations in the conference. The following were the key highlights: -



#### **1. On Electoral Integrity:**

It was noted that electoral integrity had an impact on the credibility and transparency of electoral processes. In that respect, E-HORN, urged all stakeholders in the Kenyan electoral processes to address these concerns in an accountable and transparent manner, which encouraged public confidence.

#### **2. On Campaign Financing:**

E-Horn Council Members emphasized that unregulated flow of money in the funding of political parties and election campaigns threatened key democratic principles and undermined electoral integrity. They therefore encouraged regulation of election campaign spending to enhance transparency and reduce incentives for grand corruption.

#### **3. On Electoral Insecurity:**

The threat of insecurity was underscored, specifically the use of excessive force by security agencies, violence, cyber-attacks on electronic processes, and internet outages as a major concern that needed attention by necessary stakeholders.

## Mitigating Electoral Violence: A Review of Evidence

Prakhar Sharma, Senior Researcher, International Republican Institute



To start off the session, Mr. Prakhar began by provided a global overview on electoral violence. Globally, significant violence involving civilian deaths was present in 19.23% of elections. 78% of elections are violent in countries seen as vulnerable to electoral violence (CREV) while threats and coercion are the most common forms of violence at 91.64%, followed closely by assaults and attacks (89.91%). Further, he outlined that 9% of elections experienced ‘widespread

violence’, 11% saw instances of ‘repression’ and 37% of the elections experienced ‘harassment’ in sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2014.

Indirect effects of election violence highlighted were: a decrease in electoral participation, reignition of latent social tensions and constrained political awareness among the electorate. Where people did not feel safe in the electoral process, then they would not meaningfully participate.

To mitigate electoral violence, Mr. Sharma propounded six key interventions:

- i. Deterrence interventions;
- ii. Contact Hypothesis;
- iii. Social Norms;
- iv. Informational Interventions;
- v. Networks and Coalitions and;
- vi. Coordination Interventions.

**Deterrence Interventions** – These consist of both short-term and long-term observation. They appear to deter violence on election day, but primarily in polling stations where observers are present. However, observation can displace violence to unmonitored polling stations, particularly in competitive areas, especially where parties do not have the resources to engage in fraud. Additionally, incidents of fraud are more likely to be displaced to polling stations in areas dominated by a single party with the resources to commit fraud.

Surprisingly, the presence of international election observations on election day is associated with increased violence during the pre-electoral period. This is based on a study of 330 African elections from 1990 to 2009 which shows that the presence of election observers significantly increases the incidence of pre-election violence in the three months before elections. To add, critical reports by international election-observation missions can have the unintended consequence of contributing to post-electoral violence.

**Contact Hypothesis** – Notably conducted through inter-party dialogue forums, liaison committees and multi-party mediation. Here, moderated dialogues may build cooperation among peer political party leaders that can open lines of communication and help mitigate violence. Inclusive engagement through a multiparty liaison committee with EMBs or another consultative body may help address violence.

It was also highlighted that comparative case studies of elections in Malawi, Ethiopia and Zanzibar from 2004-2005 noted that EMBs, in an effort to be perceived as independent, risk isolating themselves too much from political parties. Therefore, meaningful contact over a sustained engagement through goal-oriented projects may reduce bias and strengthen trust, at least at the interpersonal level.

**Social Norms** – These consists of cultural engagements, social/media advocacy, messaging, sporting events, pacts, peace caravans and community meetings. Firstly, it was recognized that changing social norms and attitudes takes time and often peace messaging is conducted too close to the election. Additionally, the interventions, if targeted at the population at large, will not reach individuals who are most at risk of electoral violence. Consequently, in order to be effective, peace messaging needs to be conducted by respected leaders and organizations with moral authority.

A case study of Malawi was given, lauded as the country with the most successful peace messaging program during its elections in 2014., which targeted politicians. While multiple actors — civil society groups, traditional leaders, the media — used peace messaging, the most influential messaging was conducted by the

Public Affairs Committee (PAC), an organization of religious leaders. PAC's success in helping to hold down electoral violence was attributed to its religious affiliation and perceived moral authority: Politicians feared they would lose "legitimacy" with their voters if they were seen as acting in opposition to PAC's message.

Peace pacts and pledges were also acknowledged to be vehicles for changing social norms if they are actively referenced and become part of the discourse surrounding the elections. Social norm-changing interventions can discourage election day violence and these norms diffuse to individuals not involved in the interventions.

**Informational Interventions** – These comprises of peace messaging, training, community workshops, civic and voter education that seek to change attitudes and induce behavioural changes. A comparative study of the 2017 elections in Liberia and Kenya found that civic and voter education interventions were associated with reduced violence in Liberia, but not Kenya. This was because programs in Liberia were more inclusive and were more likely to reach citizens regardless of their gender or age while on the other hand, programs were not locally tailored in Kenya. It was suggested that programs need to be long-term, piloted before the elections, and continued after the elections to be effective.

Election education conducted by impartial facilitators can prevent violence even in conflict areas and non-consolidated democracies. Election Observation Mission reports may also be seen as informational interventions with respect to post-electoral violence and protest. They provide what may be viewed as an unbiased assessment of whether the elections were free and fair that is widely shared with citizens and stakeholders.

**Networks and Coalitions** – These take the form of domestic election observation, early warning systems, advocacy and parallel vote tabulation. Networks may be particularly beneficial for working on highly technical functions, such as early monitoring and warning systems for electoral violence and parallel vote tabulation. They may have the visibility and clout to influence government and stakeholders that single organizations may not have, and thus can set the agenda.



Further, they must be viewed as independent and nonpartisan. International funding for networks and coalitions can lead to accusations of bias or partisanship. However, networks and coalitions can be susceptible to disagreements and conflict, which can diminish their impact.

**Coordination Interventions** – These revolve around codes of conduct, peace pacts and pledges and security coordination committees. Pacts, Pledges and Codes of Conduct are more relevant to mitigate lower levels of state-initiated violence. Codes of conduct that are non-enforceable are unlikely to be effective. It was noted that political party consultative mechanisms seem to be important parts of political party codes of conduct. They foster accountability for political behavior to prevent violence, facilitate interparty communications to manage violence and provide a dispute resolution mechanism to mediate disputes before they lead to violence.

It was underscored that the Ghanaian code was frequently pointed to as a model voluntary code of conduct. The code is revised well in advance of each election. Spearheaded by the Ghana Political Parties Program (GPPP), a group of political parties represented in Parliament, over the prior year, it is a document created by peers. The code establishes a national and regional enforcement body, and party leaders meet once a month at the EMB to review compliance with it. While there are no legal mechanisms to hold signatories accountable, they may be rebuked or publicly called out by the GPPP, their peers or the enforcement body.

Limitations of the existing approaches identified were interventions are not targeted, projects often focus on a single intervention without an evaluation plan to measure impact and multiple interventions by different organizations were not coordinated.

Mr. Sharma outlined IRI-led MEV innovations which included: elicit pacts and pledges by engaging political party leadership at the national/sub-nationals levels and a top-down approach that attempts to hold ‘inciters’ accountable; targeted peace messaging by engaging the most vulnerable/unemployed youth and a bottom-up approach that targets the ‘incited’ rather than the ‘inciters; and



long-term election/security monitors by creating a deterrence mechanism and establishing an early-warning system.

### Plenary Session

It was noted that the peace pact in Ghana worked due to the timing; the closer it is to the election, the more effective it is. Therefore, timing was key in collaboration with dissemination of information and messages regularly towards the creation of an ecosystem for peaceful messaging. Political parties also have a crucial role to play in the enforcement of the pacts.




Media engagement was also raised a critical area for action considering the crucial and active role that media plays in shaping people's opinions. It was recommended that there needs more examination by election observers into the level of media engagement and reporting.

## Key Action Points/Way Forward

The following were presented as key considerations and way forward from the Conference as follows:-

15. Development of homegrown solutions to regulate political financing that take into account the cultural, legal and practical context of the country (context matters).
16. Need for objective reporting by citizen observation platforms to improve the quality of election observation.
17. Civil Society Organizations and Observer platforms should enhance regional solidarity to support each other and lobby relevant duty-bearers to domesticate and comply with international standards and protocols.
18. There is need to develop minimum regional standards on election observation for purposes of clarity and uniformity across the region.
19. Thorough assessment and review of new frontiers such as internet shutdowns, social media spaces and hate speech.
20. Creation of a regional Scorecard to objectively assess the performance of duty-bearers during the electoral period.
21. Mainstreaming the inclusion agenda into observation missions.
22. Address long-standing electoral grievances and violations through affirmation of victims and continuously lobby for perpetrators to be brought to book.
23. Creation of a rubric to define and establish clear differences between electoral violence and other civil conflicts fueled by elections.
24. Lobbying and advocacy for definitive legal and regulatory frameworks on political financing.
25. Utilization of multi-dimensional interventions as civil society actors to mitigate electoral violence.
26. Leveraging on networks and coalitions such as E-HORN that have visibility and clout to influence Government and relevant electoral stakeholders.
27. Expansion of scope of election observation and observe different aspects of electoral processes; pre, during and post elections.
28. Lobbying and advocating for structured minimum standards and/or Regulations to ensure the security and safety of electoral observers.



## New Leadership of E-HORN Council



Following the E-HORN Council Meeting, the outgoing Chairperson, Mr. Chrispin Kaheru announced the following as the new leadership for the E-HORN Council:

1. Dr. Sarah Bireete – Chairperson (Uganda)
2. Mr. Missud – Vice Chairperson (Ethiopia)
3. Mr. James Okony – Treasurer (South Sudan)
4. Ms. Anne Ileri, ELOG – Secretariat (Kenya)

He congratulated the new Council for taking up the noble cause and expressed gratitude for the support he received. He formally handed over to the Dr. Bireete, the incoming Chairperson.

### **Closing Remarks – Dr. Sarah Bireete, Chairperson of E-HORN**

She expressed gratitude for the responsibilities assigned to her and pledged commitment and hard work during her term. Consequently, she briefly highlighted a summary agenda resolved by the E-HORN Council members which consisted of:

- i. Joint observer missions with the member States, beginning with Kenya in August 2022;
- ii. Capacity building and opening up of county forums;
- iii. Evidence-based Research to inform all observer missions;
- iv. Peer learning from regional bodies;
- v. Amplification of E-HORN branding in country electoral-related work; and
- vi. Sharing of work with global and other regional electoral observation bodies.

### **Vote of Thanks – Ms. Anne W. Ileri, Chairperson ELOG**

Ms. Ileri thanked the participants for their presence and vibrant participation, noting that all were vested in the process. She also stated that one of the main highlights of the Conference

was the Joint Communique which was powerful and a testament to the exceptional discussions held in the two days. Reflecting on the expectations initially outlined on the first day, she expressed hope that there would be joint and peer learning even beyond the Conference. She concluded by reiterating her sincere gratitude to the partners, IRI and NED, and delegates, without whose participation the Conference would not have been a success.

-----End of Day 2 Proceedings-----